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In the social and economic upheaval during the first decade after the fall of state
socialism in Hungary, the emergence of new neighborhoods of detached family houses
outside of a former “socialist city” provoked ambivalent reactions. Were these homes
the natural housing form for an emerging middle class in newly independent, free-
market Hungary, or a passing fad led by the nouveaux riches? This article argues that
that the eventual triumph of this suburban housing form had little to do with an
inevitable trajectory of capitalism modeled on that of the West. Instead, it was a
unique material and aesthetic form that, in the Hungarian context, was aligned with
the values of its rural precedents while at the same time distinguished from them as
“middle class.” The materiality of the new family house has not only redefined the
conditions for belonging to the ranks of a new middle class, but has been instrumental
in constituting and legitimating this emerging class. [suburbanization, housing, middle
class, state-socialism, postsocialism, Hungary]
Of the many transformations to the Hungarian landscape afterthe fall of state socialism, one of the most striking was theemergence of small “suburbanized” neighborhoods of detached
family houses. These areas were situated on the outskirts of towns or at
the edges of existing villages, carved out of agricultural land. Distinctive
architectural styles set these houses apart from pre-socialist peasant
houses as well as the more modern houses built during the decades of
state socialism (1948–1989). Instead of productive gardens and areas for
livestock, these new houses flaunted elements of leisure and decorative
display: gazebos, lawns, flowerbeds and fountains, birdbaths and fish-
ponds. A plethora of stylized media images of the single family house
with a red-tiled roof accompanied the emergence of these new houses.
Referred to by Hungarians as the “family house with garden” (kertes
családi ház), the image was used in advertisements for everything from
building materials and home insurance to the grand prize in product-
related raffles.
This architectural development was particularly noticeable in
Dunaújváros, the socialist “new town” where I carried out my anthro-
pological fieldwork in the mid to late 1990s.1 This provincial town of
under 60,000 people had been built in the early 1950s on agricultural
fields on a plateau above the Danube River as a model, planned town
adjacent to a new steel factory. It had borne the name Sztálinváros or
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“City of Stalin” until 1961, when it was renamed Dunaújváros or “New
City on the Danube.” After the collapse of state-socialism, 85 percent of
the town’s population continued to live in the multi-story concrete
blocks of apartments which comprised most of the city. Nonetheless, in
an interview the city planner stated matter-of-factly: “Everyone who can
is moving out to a family house.” Like many Hungarians (as well as many
western observers), she considered the family house phenomenon to be a
natural response to the new economic and political reforms of bourgeois
capitalism, a continuation of long term Hungarian practices and values,
and a sign that Hungary belonged in Europe.2 Even to observers more
critical than the city planner, the houses seemed to fit a familiar story of
suburbanization. The overpowering image of oppressive urban public
housing being replaced by private, detached homes reinforced conven-
tional understandings of a transition from state socialism to market
capitalism, whereby socialist welfare and the collective values it stood for
are replaced by neoliberal regimes that seek to produce self-governing,
autonomous subjects.
And yet, such surface similarities are misleading. Socialist Hungary
was unusual in leaving most homes in private ownership after 1948,
and much of the apartment block housing constructed by the socialist
state after the 1960s was owner-occupied from the start; what remained
of state-owned housing was quickly privatized in 1991–92. While Hun-
garians were well-aware of suburban middle-class culture elsewhere,
such a housing form and the conditions for its existence (infrastructure,
private cars, and the notion of a commuting middle class) still had to
be constructed for most of Hungary.3 Construction of these new houses
was neither facilitated by the economic policies of the new state, nor
were they embraced by the socialist-era professional, managerial and
Figure 1. Advertisement in the Budapest subway for housing development outside of the capital city,
reading: “Homes in Budapest’s Green Gate,” and displaying an iconic image of the family house with
red-tiled roof and loving family. Photo by author.
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white-collar classes living in the new town—many of whom regarded
them with a mixture of skepticism and distaste. In order to become
accepted and valorized as an appropriate dwelling form for a modern
and respectable middle class, the “family house” had to overcome lin-
gering associations with rural backwardness and worker-peasant lif-
estyles. It also had to deflect associations with the elaborate villas of
corrupt socialist-era political elites and the new villas of an equally
corrupt postsocialist economic elite (Czegledy 1998). To add to these
obstacles, economic conditions for building were worse than they had
been for years. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1990s, the aspiring
middle classes in Dunaújváros had either embraced or capitulated to
the notion that such a house was a defining element of middle-class
respectability.
The widespread acceptance of the new family house with garden
was accomplished, I will argue in this article, through its material and
aesthetic forms. These forms appropriated and transformed the existing
values they indexed and the kind of lifestyles they appeared to make
possible. The new suburban house legitimated its presence on the land-
scape (and that of its inhabitants) through a symbolic opposition to the
apartment blocks of state socialism. These houses also distinguished
themselves from their rural neighbors through a distinctive aesthetic
drawing on new materials, technologies and building methods. Yet
house builders and their advocates were nonetheless able to align this
new house form with values as they had become materialized in their
rural precedents: the houses built during the socialist 1960s to 1980s,
as well as the weekend or summer cottages of a socialist middle
stratum. New houses that were of markedly postsocialist construction
and style also provided the space for realizing norms and ideals for
respectable, middle-class life. The costs of participation in this new
house form excluded a large number of people who had considered
themselves to be members of a respectable, socialist middle stratum, but
they also offered others, once excluded from such a stratum, the pos-
sibility of admittance to an emerging middle class (cf. Freeman 2007).
The new suburban house was thus a material form around and through
which an otherwise diverse population began to coalesce and differen-
tiate itself.
Figure 2. Dunaújváros in 1997. Panel construction apartment buildings on the plateau behind old and
new family housing in the village below. Photo by author.















Others have addressed similar processes of social differentiation and
conflict through housing in the ongoing development of suburbs and in
the rise of a commercial real estate sector in the United States and
elsewhere, such as in China (Zhang 2008). In these cases, the design and
construction of new dwellings is done primarily by commercial develop-
ers with varying degrees of involvement by the state—which might
provide the necessary infrastructure or guarantee financing. In Hungary,
by contrast, little new housing outside of the metropolitan capital of
Budapest has been built by such schemes since 1990. Just as during the
socialist period, most new family houses continue to be designed and
constructed piecemeal, each one the private project of an individual or
family in a process called “self build” or “autoconstruction” (Holston
1991). The role of this house form in constituting a new middle class has
been as much in the production process itself as in how it is consumed
and appropriated. This process demands resources and labor, mobilizes
contacts, draws upon and innovates architectural styles, and facilitates
(or obstructs) bodily and social practices.4 It can thus provide us with a
picture of the heterogeneous forces at play in producing a provincial
middle class in Hungary, one smaller and differently constituted than the
socialist middle stratum that preceded it.
Private home-ownership and social stratification through living
space have long operated as markers of status, but they have also been
a means through which middle-class culture is formed. In other words,
beyond simply reflecting new social stratifications, we can see the new
family house as constitutive of a new kind of middle class. In making this
argument, I am building on the work of scholars who take the materi-
ality of the built environment into consideration in their analysis of
social and cultural processes, demonstrating how the material objects
that people produce in turn serve to produce people; as Nancy Munn
has shown, objects and subjects can be reciprocal agents of each other’s
value (Munn 1986). In Daniel Miller’s work on modern mass produc-
tion and consumption, social relations are produced by as much as
reflected in the ways people select, exchange, and consume material
goods (Miller 1987; 2005). In the case at hand, the emerging middle
class is being produced by these new residential spaces, not only by how
they are decorated and what they symbolize, but in how such material
worlds provide new “affordances and constraints” (Tilley 2007:19) to
socializing, to activities such as cooking, cleaning and gardening, to
movement and other bodily experience, and to new possibilities for
privacy. Thus we can see how the material properties of these houses
vastly exceed their role in representation (Keane 2003, 2006). For
example, our experience of a room is shaped in part by whether its walls
can keep out the cold as well as the sounds of neighbors and the street.
Finally, I have attempted to be attentive to what Bruno Latour has
provocatively called the agency of things (Latour 2005), meaning that
built environments must be seen as networks of human and non-human
actors whose capacities are not wholly projections of human intention




In 1994, Laura, the owner of a small English language school inDunaújváros, embarked with her new husband upon building a large,detached “family house” on agricultural land in the outskirts of a
nearby village. Like most city residents, Laura had lived all of her 35 years
in small, urban apartments. Because her father was a doctor, her child-
hood home had been relatively spacious. It had an entry-way, a main
room with a balcony, one bedroom, a kitchen large enough for a small
table and chairs, and a bathroom and W.C. As was customary in “good
families,” the bedroom was the “child’s domain” (gyerekbirodalom).
Laura’s parents slept on a pull-out couch in the multifunction living
room, and every morning stowed the bedding in cabinets. When Laura
married her first husband, she moved to a smaller two-room apartment,
and when her daughter Virág was born, she was given the only bedroom.
In contrast, the new house was set in a large, enclosed garden, and
featured cathedral ceilings with an exposed second floor (with space for
several additional rooms), three finished bedrooms, two-and-a-half
baths, a kitchen open onto the living room, and a two-car garage. Laura
was particularly thrilled about the separate laundry and sewing rooms.
Laura’s ambitions for her house were on the extravagant side for the
time, placing her among the first to build this kind of new home on the
edges of a village 15 km from the town. But her desire for a substantial
transformation of her living environment was shared by increasing
numbers of people. Some middle-aged professionals were considering a
move to a family house, while others moved to better apartments within
the city or embarked on transformations to their interior spaces. A few
intrepid residents had managed to blast through poured concrete walls of
Figure 3. New middle class houses in a village 12 kms outside of Dunaújváros, featuring red tile roofs





apartments to create the coveted “American kitchen” (amerikai konyha)
or kitchen open to the living area. Bathrooms were upgraded as space and
ingenuity allowed, linoleum replaced with ceramic tile. Throughout the
socialist-era buildings, old, uniform front doors, often made of PVC, were
replaced with wood doors or personalized with a brass door knocker or
name plate. These new construction and renovation projects, under-
taken at a time of great economic uncertainty, were often achieved at an
expense far beyond a family’s means (Magyar Nemzet 1996/10/15).
In the decade following the regime change, the transforming land-
scape was often narrated via a “discourse of the normal” which divided
the material world between spaces and objects that conformed to Hun-
gary’s new geo-political status and thus assisted in its integration into a
European order, and those that remained largely unchanged, part of a
discredited socialist past (Fehérváry 2002). Within this context, Hun-
garians aspiring to or identifying with middle-class status faced an
imperative to adopt material signs of postsocialist status and to normalize
them in everyday life, aligning themselves symbolically and discursively
with the postsocialist order (cf. Rausing 1998). As with emerging middle-
classes in other peripheral nation-states, the material requirements for
local middle-class belonging are often dictated by commodified images
and consumer goods depicting middle-class respectability in a “first
world” (Liechty 2003; Foster 2002; O’Dougherty 2002). Such materiali-
ties carry with them the promise of a set of benefits on a global scale: a full
“humanity” conferred by coeval status with the West, moral legitimacy,
respectability, local status, and a host of other, materially-enabled
desires—many of them firmly grounded in a comfortable home.
In the former socialist new town of Dunaújváros, these distinctions
were felt particularly acutely. Residents were well aware that in the rest
of the country, this city was understood to be one of the “ugliest” in
Hungary, an exemplar of Soviet city planning and modern architecture.
Here, as elsewhere in the country, the transformation of the material
environment according to post-socialist norms was central to the estab-
lishment of a collective and individual presence in a transformed
present—even as they were alarming signs of the disruption of a familiar
social order and moral code. The material forms of new houses are thus
carefully evaluated to judge the moral legitimacy of those they shelter.
From the middle stratum to a middle class:
Idealized social groups and their materialities
Hungarian national politics after the fall of state socialism wasdominated by a neoliberal ideology which greatly influenced thedirection of sweeping institutional reforms. As with new govern-
ments across the region, Hungarian politicians considered the reestab-
lishment of private property central to the political legitimacy of the new
order, a position that was also required by international actors such as the
IMF and the World Bank as a condition for loans (Verdery 2003:3).
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Privatization of state-owned housing in particular was seen as “essential
to ending the dependency of citizen on the state” (Ruble 1995:29). In
Hungary, the moral correctness of private property as an institution was
at times equated with the restoration of the country as an independent,
Christian nation-state—as in the following editorial on the front page of
the Dunaújváros newspaper: “St. Stephen [Hungary’s patron saint] made
Christianity the law of the land, but also sanctified the law of property”
(Dunaújvárosi Hírlap, 8/1996:1).
At the same time, the instability of financial institutions prevented
the new regime from doing more than rapidly divesting itself of state-
owned property, including the privatization of apartments in housing
blocks. Politicians discussed the importance of establishing some kind of
mortgage system, but until the 2000s, inflation and economic insecurities
limited the scope of these plans, and with it, the development of a real
estate sector.5 In metropolitan Budapest, private (often foreign) devel-
opers began to build multi-story “residential parks” as well as villa style
and lower-rise developments (Bodnár and Molnár 2010), targeting a
population of expatriates and a new crop of Hungarian entrepreneurs and
professionals often working for foreign companies. But Dunaújváros and
other small provincial towns were not an appealing prospect for real
estate developers, particularly for the residential market. The primary
form of new residential construction was therefore through the time-
honored practice of families building houses for themselves, either
through exchanges of collective labor or a newer system of piece-meal
contracting.
Despite these limitations, an unopposed assumption in politics and
the media was that Hungary’s future as a democratic nation-state
depended upon the emergence of a strong middle class based on private
property. As Polish anthropologist Michal Buchowski has written, “the
new middle class [in eastern Europe] is a concept influenced by teleo-
logical ideas of ‘transformation,’ and it plays an ideological role in the
building of the new liberal political and ideological order” (2008:49).
The size, character, and viability of this elusive middle class were bitterly
contested. The term “middle class” (középosztály) was often used inter-
changeably with “middle stratum” (középréteg) or “bourgeois citizenry”
(polgár), though the significance of these three terms differed. Use of
“middle class” itself was a new thing. Talking openly about class made
explicit the new legitimacy of economic inequalities in a market democ-
racy, and some politicians talked of the resurrection of an historic bour-
geoisie. But all grappled with how a large, socialist-era middle stratum
was to fare within the new order.
The term “middle strata” had been coined by Hungarian sociologists
in the 1960s to describe the middle layers of socialist society as they were
defined by position, income and modern consumer lifestyles—and to
sidestep reference to traditional class hierarchies and inherited status.6
This broad, middle stratum was not an epiphenomenon of a socialist
organization of production, but an explicit goal of the state’s modernizing















paired with attempts to civilize “backward” populations into a modern,
urban working class—in part through cultural programs (theater, classi-
cal music, literacy) but also through modern apartments, consumer
goods, and new standards for hygiene. By the 1960s, Communist-bloc
states began to take seriously the need to improve standards of living, in
part to ameliorate social unrest, but in part as an extension of the Cold
War to the realm of consumer culture. In Hungary, the Kádár regime
was unique in how far it was able to push market reforms within the
framework of a planned economy. Material benefits for skilled-labor,
management and white-collar workers, and the profits generated by
second-economy activities, resulted in economic inequalities and the
emergence of new systems of distinction (Róna-Tas 1997, S. Nagy 1987).
The socialist state’s promotion of a modern, discerning consumerism
and the cultivation of good taste contributed to the development of what
Mark Liechty calls a normative, “middle-class culture,” in which respect-
ability is tied to the acquisition of modern consumer goods and living
environments (Liechty 2003). Home décor magazines, women’s journals,
newspaper editorials and film clips admonished the growing population
living in small apartments to replace traditional furniture with modern
versions, even if they had to make it themselves. With an open floor
plan, tastemakers opined, Socialist citizens could divide small spaces into
areas accommodating the needs of diverse individuals—an entertain-
ment center for the man of the house, the sewing table for the wife/
mother, and the all-important “children’s corner” so that the child could
develop a sense of having his or her own, inviolate domain for toys and
study (Bánk 1967). At the same time, space for a designated bedroom
and for a family dining area, even in the kitchen, was considered super-
fluous; multipurpose furniture such as the pull-out sofa resolved the
problem of sleeping, and designs for already small kitchens were progres-
sively reduced in size, eroding the institution of the large family meal.
By the 1970s, the vast middle stratum had expectations for an urban
apartment, with modern, labor-saving appliances and television; occa-
sional cultural outings and vacations; and a weekend cottage in the
countryside. The state-run media explicitly encouraged comparison of
this lifestyle, presented as a benefit of living in a socialist state, with that
of average citizens in the First World. And in fact, while their forms and
timing differed, there were many parallels in the kinds of societal trans-
formations taking place in the Euro-American west and in socialist
Hungary, particularly the extension of middle class status to a far greater
percentage of the population through modern housing and respectable
consumption. While cookie-cutter suburban houses with lawns were a
symbol of postwar prosperity for the U.S., even for the average worker
(Jackson 1987; May 1988), in Hungary the ideal modern lifestyle con-
sisted of the stimulation of the city in an urban apartment during the work
week, balanced by a weekend relaxing in the quiet, fresh air of a rural
cottage and garden. For example, the longtime director of the
Dunaújváros steel mill, one of the most powerful men in Communist
Hungary, lived in one of the few four-room apartments in the city and had
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a tidy weekend cottage on the banks of the Danube. This middle-stratum
culture was discursively positioned between an uncouth proletariat, back-
ward peasants and poor Roma (gypsies) on the one hand, and the rem-
nants of an old-fashioned bourgeoisie or déclassé gentry on the other.
While in hindsight the 1970s are remembered as a time of relative
prosperity, the economic crises and market reforms of the 1980s meant
that many Hungarians were moon-lighting in second economy jobs just
to maintain their standard of living. Thus, as the middle stratum increas-
ingly defined their harried experience of modern, daily life as abnormal,
they idealized the lifestyles they imagined their counterparts in western
Europe and the United States enjoyed—somewhat ironically, given that
neoliberal reforms were having similar effects on middle-class life there.
The conditions for a “normal” life and personhood, including such tran-
scendent values as family harmony and self-realization, were understood
to reside in material worlds as they existed in “normal” parts of the world.
With the end of state socialism and the obstacles it presented, members
of socialist middle stratum fully expected to constitute the new Hungar-
ian middle class, finally able to realize lifestyles commensurate to their
professional positions. Instead, most found themselves struggling to
“keep up” their social status in the face of economic and institutional
upheaval (Berdahl 1999; Fehérváry 2002; Patico 2008).
References to a historic middle class, or bourgeois-citizenry (polgár),
were openly used in politics only after 1989—indeed, became the name
of the dominant conservative, nationalist Party.7 The state-socialist
regime had somewhat successfully disrupted the material basis for tradi-
tional class hierarchies, but had been less successful in discrediting them
as cultural categories. The significance of the term polgár after socialism
stemmed from how it had been developed as part of an oppositional
discourse during the socialist era. An urban bourgeoisie had never been
the symbolic embodiment of Hungarian national values and culture, as it
had been associated with “foreign” elements in Budapest, primarily of
German and Jewish origin engaged in capitalist enterprise in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. Instead, the site of an authentic Hungarian
nation had in the past been on the land, associated with an autonomous
peasantry and gentry values.
In the late 1970s, a dissident intelligentsia revived and revalued this
bourgeois category. Drawing in part on Habermas’s Structural Transfor-
mation of the Public Sphere, translated into Hungarian in 1971, writers like
György (George) Konrád (1984) proposed that a sphere of autonomy
from the state—a kind of anti-political civil society—might be devel-
oped based on second economy activities. The domestic social relations
and material trappings of this bourgeois private sphere were a fundamen-
tal part of its idealization.8 For many people, as cultural geographer Judit
Bodnár notes, “the ideological attack on the bourgeoisie effectively made
anything ‘bourgeois’ an element of a desirable past” (Bodnár 2007:142).
For some of the urban intelligentsia, the use of polgár referred to hopes for
the revival of latent political and cultural dispositions as much as eco-
















(embourgeoisment) was more often used to mean transforming the men-
talities of the entire population: eradicating mentalities of entitlement
and dependence on the state, reforming slack work habits, and fostering
risk-taking, entrepreneurial activities as well as civic responsibility
(Szelényi 1988).
The ascendance of this bourgeois category came with an open
devaluation of socialist values and of the working class, a class increas-
ingly associated with an unnatural form of government as well as with
characteristics of dependency and lack of initiative. The socialist state
participated in this shift in class values in the 1980s, not only through
economic reforms but by officially recognizing that a small-scale entre-
preneurial stratum would “continue to contribute for some time to the
life of socialist society.”9 The socialist state also threatened unemploy-
ment as a measure to “discipline” the working classes who were depicted
in the official media as lazy and shiftless.
For many Hungarians, and particularly for an aspiring middle class in
Dunaújváros, the celebration of a Hungarian bourgeoisie in the 1990s
implied the privileging of those who could claim some form of polgár
ancestry, and thus the restoration of a form of social stratification that
had been discredited for forty years. For the majority of the population
who had no real claim to polgár status, as well as for many who did,
contemporary models of middle-class life and ostensibly merit-based
social structures to be found in western Europe or the United States were
far more appealing. Moreover, once disparaged occupations like the
manager and entrepreneur were rapidly shifting in value from ambiguous
to heroic. As we will see below, the role of the mass media in constructing
these imaginings cannot be overstated.
Materializing a new middle class
While there was little agreement as to what type of person wasconstituting a new Hungarian middle class in the 1990s,images of the range of material trappings for this class were
everywhere. Television shows, decorating magazines and pull-out sec-
tions in newspapers continuously exposed the population to new designs
for housing, for interior decoration and renovation. Just as in the socialist
period, people continued to be attentive to the material settings of
foreign movies and television shows. These were understood to be the
settings for average, middle-class families—not of course the decor of
Dallas, which many people thought was tacky—but that of movies like
Steve Martin’s Father of the Bride (Shyer 1991) where the family lives in
an enormous house with an open kitchen and a living room decorated
entirely in white. It was precisely the unmarked quality of these material
worlds, incidental to the plot or story line that implied a taken-for-
granted, “normal” standard of living.
Images of such material worlds came as much from Hungarian
sources as from imports. Television, print media and retail spaces con-















material environments for self-respecting Hungarian citizens. Furniture
store displays, interior decorating shops and Home Depot-style DIY
stores did the same, reinforcing the notion that such upgrades to one’s
living space were necessary to mark one’s place in the postsocialist order.
Regularly featured was the classic interior of the historic, urban bour-
geoisie or polgár, ensconced in spacious apartments filled with antique
furnishings, alien origins conveniently forgotten. The setting equated
with an urban professional class, surrounded by high-tech modern décor
or variations of IKEA, was also ubiquitous and situated in either older
buildings or socialist-era estates. The setting for an autonomous, entre-
preneurial middle class, however, was invariably a detached family house
with a roof of bright red tile.
The trouble with the family house
The ideological power of this new, suburban house form came as muchfrom its symbolic opposition to the built environment of state social-ism as from idealizations of western models. In the simple aesthetic
code of the post-socialist era, the values state-socialist rhetoric had
assigned to these two housing forms were inverted. Housing estates were
being equated with the past, with discredited ideals of collectivism, and
with a denigrated urban proletariat, while the detached family house was
acquiring new value as materializing the autonomy, property rights, and
prestige of a new, capitalist middle class.10
For Dunaújváros’s former middle stratum of professionals, educators,
civil servants and skilled workers, however, such ideological rhetoric did
not align with their experience of single-family housing forms during the
decades of state socialism. Housing forms had been heavily implicated in
state-socialist ideology of egalitarianism, the development of a classless
society, the eventual elimination of private property and full urbaniza-
tion. Urban apartment buildings, whatever their exact design, had been
assumed to be the appropriate housing form in all iconography of the
socialist future. In contrast, the private family house had been politically
condemned as a vestige of the past, conducive to private individualism
whether in the backward peasant house or urban bourgeois villa. This
political rhetoric was backed by policy, as state investment in infrastruc-
ture privileged the development of urban environments at the expense of
the rural. At the same time, in order to ameliorate continuing housing
shortages, the state not only permitted but planned for families to build
their own housing outside of cities. As early as the 1950s, the state made
provisions for single-family houses built by their future occupants, even
in the model socialist town of Dunaújváros (Pittaway 2000). When the
Party revealed its controversial 15-year housing plan of 1960, it projected
that such self-built housing would account for a full 40 percent of the
million units it claimed would be built over the period, the rest to be built
by the state in the form of urban apartment buildings.11 By the 1980s,






And yet, the increasing prevalence of self-built, single-family houses
did not make them a symbol of middle stratum respectability, particularly
in regions like Dunaújváros where pre-socialist era bourgeois villas were
few and the models for the self-built family house were the Kuria (or
manorial estate) on the one hand and the houses of a diverse peasantry on
the other. The preference for an apartment during socialism had more to
do with the conditions for acquiring and living in one as compared to the
conditions for building a house. Obtaining a state-owned apartment often
involved a years-long wait, but once allocated it was a good deal: low rents,
free maintenance, and the option to bequeath the rights to the apartment
to one’s offspring. In contrast, the “self-built” mode of house production
was arduous and lengthy, lasting anywhere from two to ten years. The
strain entailed risks to family relations and marriages. The challenges of
obtaining materials was endless, while labor was extracted from extended
family, friends and through a rural system of exchange for building houses
called kaláka (Sik 1988). The saying “to throw oneself into building”
(Belevágni az építkezésbe) acknowledged the Herculean challenges of “do-
it-yourself” housing (Kenedi 1981). Severe housing shortages meant that
for many Hungarians, particularly of the working classes, self-build was the
only route to acquiring their own homes.12 The state encouraged such
building through pronatalist policies, offering young couples building
loans and outright grants for each child they promised to have, even as it
did little to make the building itself any easier. Market reforms beginning
in the late 1960s meant that many such self-built village houses became
spaces for profitable second-economy endeavors, for raising livestock and
growing produce (Róna-Tas 1997).
In Dunaújváros, the socialist middle stratum never embraced the
family house form, despite the centrally-located “garden city” neighbor-
hood that had been set aside for such buildings (Miskolczi 1980). The
Figure 4. Self-built houses from the 1980s on the left, alongside older peasant houses on the right, near
to a suburbanizing area of a village 20 km from Dunaújváros. Photo by author.
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demographic composition of most home-builders in the area was of
rural-entrepreneurs and worker-peasants, those who had the contacts
and knowledge of village life to mobilize kaláka practices, and who did
not shy away from the dirt and back-breaking labor involved. In contrast,
centrally-located and state-owned apartments were among the most pres-
tigious in the city, housing a greater number of professionals, many of
whom had been lured to the provincial backwater of a town by the
promise of an apartment. Even though most of these central apartments
were built during the Stalinist period, they were of much higher quality
than those built using panel concrete technology after 1960—with
parquet floors, higher ceilings and thicker walls. These apartments were
also exceedingly difficult to acquire, particularly as the state gradually
phased out construction of state-owned apartments in favor of
cooperative-style buildings requiring a substantial down-payment.
Thus well into the postsocialist 1990s, media representations of the
new, red-roofed family house were set against a landscape where actual
instantiations of such buildings were a novelty, a new residential housing
form provoking both admiration and concern. Indeed, the response of
many of this socialist middle stratum in Dunaújváros to the family house
continued to be ambivalent, particularly among those 40 or older. In one
case, a former Party official’s daughter had built a spacious new loft
apartment in the city, in the same building that her parents and grand-
mother had apartments, but had sold it to build a “family house with
garden” in a nearby village. The Party official felt that her daughter had
been taken in by “a passing fad” of the nouveau riches, echoing the
condemnatory rhetoric of modernist architects in debates about housing
in the 1960s and 70s (Major and Osskó 1981). In another case, a soci-
ologist at the local Junior College insisted that her colleague, who had
just built herself a family house, was what she called, rather disparagingly:
“the property-owning type . . . someone who lives to work on her house
and garden.” The sociologist, for her part, claimed to prefer living in her
urban apartment during the week, and doing a little gardening in the
fresh air of her cottage garden on the weekends. For her, urban life was
equated with a desirable and morally-imbued sociality. As she put it: “I
like social life, to visit friends for a quick coffee, or to pop downstairs to
go shopping. I would feel isolated in a family house.”
Such resistance to the family house was most often expressed by
people who adhered to an older way of life gradually being challenged
by the emergence of new alternatives. Claims to respectability based
on profession or education, for example, might not be honored in a
new socio-economic order. Indeed, for a significant proportion of
Dunaújváros’s former middle stratum, a family house of any kind was
simply out of reach. With the exception of new family grants, the gov-
ernment had frozen support for new house building. During the 1990s,
bank loans were difficult to obtain, even at the interest rate of 28–32
percent, and a mortgage system had not yet been developed. Inflation
meant the price of building materials was skyrocketing. Moreover, the
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socialist peasant-entrepreneurs by scale and design also involved a new
mode of production.13
Changes in modes of production served to widen the perceived gulf
that was growing between house builders still building using forms of
kaláka, and those using newer, contract services—differences that were
materialized in the resulting structures. Kaláka was on the decline as
stonemasons, electricians and plumbers were able to command high
prices on an open market, and new time constraints meant that neigh-
bors and friends were no longer as able or willing to lend their services.
It was being replaced by a newer type of building called önerő (self-
powered), which relied on the labor of immediate family, some hired-
hands (often illegal immigrant Romanian-Hungarian laborers), and
professionals where needed. This building mode, which used more skilled
labor, was able to take advantage of new building materials and tech-
nologies to produce the prototypical family house of the new middle
class. At the same time, it was in turn distinguished from housing that
was entirely contracted to professionals. Political cartoons often revealed
the disconnect between older forms of self-build and newer, contract
Figure 5. Political cartoons from local and national newspapers highlighted the differences between new
house builders in the 1990s who used hired, professional labor, and those still attempting to do the
building themselves. Reprinted courtesy of the Dunaújvárosi Hírlap.
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modes of production, new building materials, and the new category of
person they indexed.
Legitimizing the new family house for Hungary
The new house builders of the mid-1990s, like my friend Laura,represented a vanguard with a vision for middle-class life inHungary. Since such suburban homes had not yet been established,
they went out of their way to distinguish themselves from their peasant
or working-class neighbors through the material forms of the house and
the styles of life they represented. Their cultivated lawns and rock
gardens made them anathema to the rural peasantry, for whom the
multi-use garage, productive garden or livestock pen indexed a work
ethic essential for respectability (Lampland 1995:316–323), but also to
an older generation of city dwellers with weekend gardens, who were
driven to tend, pick, and preserve whatever grew on their plots.
At the same time, new family houses were being legitimated by their
alignment with a countryside as it was being revalued in opposition to
the socialist city; as Raymond Williams has shown, this enduring oppo-
sition between country and city is transformed and deployed in times of
change (Williams 1973). Even though the political economy of building
a “family house with garden” had been fundamentally transformed, the
new suburban house drew upon continuities with both the weekend
cottage and the self-built village house as much as on expectations for
middle-class life shaped by the West. With its enclosed garden and
gazebos, the new suburban house took on the values once reserved for the
cottage, which contrasted the fresh air and the calming effects of being in
nature with the pollution and hectic pace of modern city life (Caldwell
2011). In Dunaújváros in particular, with its high rates of childhood
asthma attributed to pollution from the steel mill, family houses in the
Figure 6. New suburban house in village outside of Dunaújváros, painted lemon yellow. While the
simpler house form is more typical of older construction practices, the decorative garden announces its





country were seen as healthier places to raise children and in general
more conducive to a balanced family life. But the new family house
ironically was also associated with houses built through kaláka, or self-
built. The private sphere of the home, whether of an urban apartment or
rural family house, had been idealized as islands of autonomy and privacy
from the socialist state. As we have seen, populist writers had looked in
particular to provincial peasant entrepreneurs to become the new entre-
preneurial classes. These writers lauded the human capacities mobilized
by the privately-owned materialities of a family house and its garden.
Sándor Kopátsy, for example, an economist and regular contributor to
the magazine Family House: The Magazine for Builders, Engineers, Archi-
tects, Entrepreneurs and Dreamers, listed the idealized virtues of houses
built through kaláka just as it was declining as the primary mode of family
house building:
First: Nothing brought together the extended family, the circle of
friends, more than mutual building (kaláka). Second: There was no
better school for polytechnic capabilities than constructing your own
utilities. Many hundreds of thousands learned this way to plaster, to
install and repair electricity and plumbing. Third: Nothing brought as
much self-confidence as the finished house and its further beautifica-
tion. A house with a garden promotes the development of everyday
feelings of success and happiness. The need to fix something, the first
ripe fruit, the most beautiful rose on the block—these make the resi-
dents better, more optimistic (Kopátsy 1993).
This form of family house, Kopátsy suggested, inculcated a sense of
self-sufficiency and pride in the visible fruits of labor on one’s own
property. In the early 1990s, conservative proponents of the family house
failed to recognize that the kind of person now building them had no
interest in cultivating produce on their property. They were using as little
of their own labor as possible in the building process and wanted to avoid
the onerous obligations of community-building exchange—though they
were perfectly willing to exploit their extended family for peripheral
labor and financial help.
The very term family house indexed its association with wholesome,
heteronormative married life with more than one child. Indeed,
divorced, single mothers and single men understood themselves to be
excluded from the family house, both as social norm and as practical
possibility. The material environment of the family house was supposed
to generate tasks inculcating healthy gender subjectivities, particularly
for men. For decades, city apartments had been blamed for eliminating
the adult male’s role and space in the home. Household tasks and child-
care remained the responsibility of women, so the man’s responsibilities
were reduced to drilling holes for hanging pictures and maintaining the
family car, if there was one. Masculine identity, it was assumed, would be













The new family house also provided the space for realizing wide-
spread norms for respectable middle-class life, norms that had been
fostered during the state-socialist period but were made untenable by the
design and cramped spaces of socialist apartments. These included the
expansion of an open plan and individualizing divisions of space. But
they also accommodated new desires for spaces associated with modern
lifestyles in the West, such as a dedicated master bedroom, bathrooms
liberated from drying laundry, and most of all, a large room open to the
kitchen for the family to gather. As with the villas of the new economic
elite (Czegledy 1998) these houses and their gardens also facilitated
business socializing.
Despite the diversity of these new houses, they shared an aesthetic
that not only distinguished them from the older housing forms around
them, but assisted in their construction as respectable and distinctly
Hungarian. The self-built houses of the socialist era were constructed
from standardized house designs and had been limited by available tech-
nologies, materials and state regulations on size. In contrast, new houses
were larger, and displayed clear signs of having been designed by a
professional. Their aesthetic did not resemble the commercialized repre-
sentations of such houses coming from abroad. While most sported the
bright-red roofing tiles ubiquitously advertised by multinational firms,
the houses themselves were rarely white and rectilinear. Instead, they
developed for the exterior an aesthetic that had emerged for interiors
during the 1970s, one that transformed and appropriated a state-socialist
version of modernism with organicist forms and materials. Unlike post-
modern forms in the West that featured fragmentation and renewed
attention to façade, these housing forms reflected the particular disen-
chantment with the alternative modernity being produced by the social-
ist state and its politicization. In a condemnation of the straight-line, the
rectilinear form and the standardization dictated by principles of effi-
ciency, this aesthetic featured asymmetric and rounded motifs, including
undulating roofs, round columns and arched windows. In opposition to
the artificial, mass-produced materials favored by the socialist state, these
houses made prominent use of “natural” materials, such as wood, stone,
and even reed thatch.14 And in a rejection of the moralizing aestheticism
of socialist modernism, this aesthetic promoted color, play and fantasy.
As we will see in the examples below, house builders carefully choose
among the variety of design elements available to them, attempting to
position themselves as part of this more exclusive middle class, and yet
marking their respectability through material signs of modesty and
virtue.
Despite widespread mourning for the lost security offered by state
socialism, discourses on new family houses and renovated interiors
aligned with this critique of the socialist modern project, not only its
attempt to dominate the natural world, but its profound misunderstand-
ing of the malleability of human nature. In this way, the material aes-
thetics of family houses reinforced acceptance of neoliberal ideologies





ployment, radical income inequalities, and failing medical, educational
and transportation systems. The values materialized in an anti-socialist
aesthetics legitimated these new suburban house forms along with the
diverging fortunes they represented.
Appropriating the new family house
By the mid-1990s, anyone aspiring to new middle class status had toface the often contentious question of whether or not to build afamily house, and if so, what form the house would take. Here I give
two examples. Csilla, about 35 at the time, was a director in the steel mill
whose parents had been unskilled factory workers. While on some occa-
sions she was very happy with her urban apartment, she increasingly
echoed widespread discourses in voicing her longings to move to the
“peace and quiet” of the countryside, to “escape the panel masses” which
she found so claustrophobic. Her husband János was against the idea. His
extended family had all lived in villages, and he wanted nothing to do
with the labor, the flies and the smells he associated with rural living. As
a factory driver and hand-ball coach, he also assumed a new family house
was for the wealthy directors, and simply inaccessible to someone of even
Csilla’s rank.
In another family, Margit, a lawyer in her late 40s, resisted her
husband Géza’s emerging desires for a house. For a time, both had been
disdainful of the trend. They discounted conservative rhetoric which
framed such houses as regenerating the extended family and presocialist
values and instead regarded them as symbols of the nouveau riches. None-
theless, Géza’s dissatisfaction with the panel construction apartment
grew, fueled by that of their 18-year-old son. Margit continued in her
opposition, well understanding the burdens of a house in the village—its
isolation and spotty public transportation—to fall on the woman’s shoul-
ders. More importantly, she could not assimilate the family house into
her identity as a member of an urban, polgár intelligentsia.
By the end of the decade, however, both families had moved to such
houses. In Csilla’s case, János had been unwilling to help with the
contracting necessary to build a new house, so, she found an existing one
for sale in a nearby village. It was built in the late 1980s in a neighbor-
hood of similar houses, with several peasant houses nearby, but not far
from a developing suburban neighborhood. They refurbished the interior,
painted the exterior a moss green, and installed a Finnish sauna. Though
it was not what Csilla had hoped for, it was near the field where she had
developed a passion for horseback-riding. She made sure they got several
dogs and a cat to provide their 10-year-old son—otherwise glued to the
computer screen—with a “healthy” country experience. János began to
spend far more time at home. For both, the form of their house provoked
few anxieties about their class status. In fact, evidence of Csilla’s ample
salary spilled over into the driveway where they parked their new Volvo.
With Margit’s eventual blessing, Géza, who was an engineer at a
division of the privatizing steel factory, had his dream house designed and
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supervised all aspects of the construction himself. Built in a new neigh-
borhood of such houses, their neighbors included the star of the city’s
professional women’s handball team, a former Party secretary, and a truck
driver. The house was equipped with the latest technologies, was painted
a dark watermelon pink, and the roof overhang was inlaid with wood.
The interior was spacious and well-appointed, but it made symbolic
concessions to Margit’s requirements for modesty and practicality. For
example, it had no fireplace. “Who would clean it?” she asked. The large,
luxurious bathroom—modeled on one Margit had seen a London hotel
room—had a walk-in shower but no tub: “In this busy world, who has
time to take baths?” When I visited them in 2000, Margit commented
that this neighborhood was where Dunaújváros’s middle class was
moving, using the term middle class (középosztály) rather than polgár.
When I objected that this area was hardly for the average Hungarian, she
conceded: “Yes, unfortunately in Hungary the middle class is very small.”
As for her neighbors, she was only dissatisfied with two, both based on
the form of their houses rather than their professions. One had an
oval-shaped roof that had apparently collapsed several times, a sign of the
builder’s irresponsibility and desire for extravagance beyond his abilities.
The other had small statues of cherubs and fountains in the bricked in
front yard—a sure sign for her that the family was Roma.
Conclusion
The material requirements for the imagined standards of living of“first world” middle class citizens have come to shape the emergenceof middle class culture in Hungary, particularly in the emergence of
a housing form unique in its materialization of contemporary ideals.
While the imagined benefits of such materialities are immense, falling
out of the middle class is no longer experienced solely in local terms. It
is conceptualized as failing to claim membership in a first world translocal
social order, and thus risking the invisibility of 3rd world status (Foster
2002:133–35, Liechty 2003:138–141; O’Dougherty 2002; Patico 2008).
However, as we have seen through the new, suburban family house, the
incorporation of such standards is neither immediate nor unchallenged.
The family house form in Hungary has not been one of enduring
cultural value, but has acquired newly invigorated value by virtue of its
opposition to the ideology claimed for state socialist architecture (Miller
1984; May 1988). The family house, symbolically-opposed to the social-
ist modern apartment blocks which came to stand for the collective,
artificial uniformity and forced egalitarianism of state-socialism and the
working classes, now appears as the embodiment of the “natural” values
of capitalism. Even though urban apartment blocks continue to house a
diverse spectrum of Hungarian society, including many who claim
middle-class status, the new suburban house has successfully been aligned
through discourse and material forms with the weekend cottage, con-
trasting the calming effects of nature with the invigorating (or nerve-










house of the rural-entrepreneur. It thus appears both continuous and
inevitable, coalescing into one form two values forged in opposition to
state socialism: the romanticization of nature and the idealization of the
private sphere (cf. Frykman and Löfgren 1987). The gradual triumph of
this form transformed local systems of value just as the form itself devel-
oped according to the aesthetic specificities of the Hungarian context. In
the process, the materiality of the new family house has not only rede-
fined the conditions for belonging to the ranks of respectable society, but
has been instrumental in constituting and legitimating this emerging
class.
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was provided by the Fulbright Commission (IIE) and the Social Science Research
Council (IREX).
2As writer Sándor Kopátsy opined in 1993, “We will not be truly European
when we are accepted into the European Union, but only when most families can
say, ‘My house is my castle’ ” (Családi Ház 1993:52).
3This kind of “suburbanization” did not begin until the late 1980s, even in the
metropolitan capital city of Budapest, where it took off in the 1990s (see Valuch
2004:550). Precedents included the remnants of a turn-of-the-century bourgeois
villa culture in larger cities, but also a middle class “family house with garden” form
built in the interwar period primarily in Budapest and its surrounding fringes—
though some versions of it could also be found in provincial towns, built predo-
minantly for “a lower middle class of office workers, artisans and skilled workers”
(Kósa 2000:187).
4Caroline Humphrey (2002), in contrast, shows how the large, red brick houses
of New Russians in the former Soviet Union appeared to be luxurious residences, but

















5Even in Budapest, private self-built residential units made up the majority of
new construction in the 1990s. In 2000, the state began to subsidize interest rates,
and in 2004, introduced new regulations allowing commercial banks to offer much
cheaper mortgages to home buyers in foreign currency (Bodnár and Molnár
2010:797). Many Hungarians took advantage of these mortgages to invest in real
estate, but the economic crisis of 2008 left them holding foreign currency debts that
had mushroomed with the fall of the Hungarian currency.
6The appellation “middle stratum” was in a sense justified, given that the means
of production were largely controlled by the state, no segment of the population
owned much capital, and the population enjoying this modern lifestyle included as
much of the skilled working class (predicted to become the universal class) as it did
white-collar professionals and Party elites.
7Fidesz: Magyar Polgári Szovetség in power from 1998–2002, and 2010 to present.
8Bodnár (2007:142) writes that in Hungary “ ‘bourgeois’ (polgári) as an adjective
in everyday parlance has little to do with the propertied bourgeoisie; rather, it is used
as the incarnation of objects, lifestyles, manners, and arrangements that have been
proven solid, efficient, and good.”
913th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, as reported by the
BBC, broadcast 4/8/85.
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Modernist architecture has been used primarily for large corporate structures or for
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ideology claimed for modernist architecture.
11The 15-year housing plan of 1960 was a lightning rod for contentious debates
over the appropriate housing form for the development of socialism (Major and
Osskó 1981; Molnár 2010).
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14From the late 1960s, a group of dissident architects founded an Organicist
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